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24 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Director, ORR  
FROM: Chief, Geographic Research Area  
SUBJECT: Suggestions for Preparation of a Fifteen-Year  
Intelligence Program

Phase One: Assumptions

For Full Period 1966 - 1980

It is suggested that the following be considered  
for addition:

There is likelihood of further development of a  
detente between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R.

For the First Five-Year Period (1966 - 1970)


It is suggested that Assumption Four be strengthened  
by designating the world regions in which wars of national  
liberation and other violence as well are expected -- e.g.  
black Africa, Burma, Indonesia, Latin America, etc.

We question that the dis-unity in the Western Alliance  
during this five-year period neutralizes the Sino-Soviet  
rift as implied in Assumption Five.

For the Following Ten-Year Period 1971 - 1980

It is suggested that the First Assumption regarding  
the threat of Communist China be expanded to designate the  
character of the threat to U. S. National Security.

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Phase Two: Guides to Forecasting

We suggest the addition of the following item:

"The need for more detailed and comprehensive environmental intelligence (terrain, ethnic groups, settlement, transportation, economy, etc.) to backstop clandestine operations planning, current intelligence and national estimating."

We feel that overhead surveillance should be expanded to

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[redacted] and therefore recommend that the fifth item under "GUIDE to FORECASTING" be revised to read:

"The need for development and full exploitation of multi-sensor remote sensing devices, including surveillance and intelligence-collection activities."

The statement in item 4 on page 5 needs to be expanded to read as follows:

"The need for coping with the increasing flow of raw and semi-processed materials, their storage and retrieval for quick response support of intelligence analysis as well as long-term intelligence research in depth."

We suggest the addition to the following items:

"The need to resolve conflicts and uncertainties of mission with other agencies and departments (especially DIA)."

"The need to improve CIA's program control and its organizational character to meet program objectives."

Phase Three: Statement of Program Objectives

A few general comments about the outline seem to be in order. There needs to be a clarification of the differences between intelligence production and analysis. Is the one "formal"

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(i.e., standard dissemination to outside agencies) and the other "informal" (i.e., intra-agency)? What is "Special"? Is "Basic" the NIS? Either "Geographic" or "Environmental" needs to be added to the "Analysis" list. Under "Collection", "Photo Recce" should be changed to "Remote Sensor Recce" so as to include all the other sensors that are becoming available. Under "Overt-Covert"

To be meaningful, the 15-year forecast of program objectives must be based on additional guidance and considerations as follows:

1. Will staffing needs be considered on their own merits (e.g., their relation to priority programs), or on their status relative to other programs in competing for pro-rata shares of a set T/O?
2. Will the Agency reduce, retain, or increase the level of its favor to external research? Will, say, an external research institute be preferred as a substitute for additional internal staffing?
3. Will the Directorate of Intelligence continue to favor and participate in supporting the Joint Operations Intelligence Center of SOD/DDP?
4. Will CIA attempt to keep relations with DIA about the same as the present? Will they undergo any significant change?
5. Will there be any adjustment in relations with NSA?
6. Will the DDI be permitted to program more intelligence research of a contingency nature (NIS, Handbook for Special Operations, improve desk research "readiness") in support of operations planning and wider-range current and estimative intelligence requirements?
7. What is the detailed, specific division between CIA mission and functions and those of DIA; what changes, if any, are anticipated?
8. Since our cartographic and research activities rely heavily upon an adequate data base, our program planning will be contingent upon a freedom to express program objectives without the restriction of established T/O's under austerity conditions.
- ✓ 9. We will need to have specific information about developments in automation in map-making, the establishment of data banks, machine "drawing", computer-plotted map projections, new concepts in printing and changes in the use of visual aids for briefing purposes.
10. A knowledge of relative emphasis within CIA on current, scientific, basic, operational, and special intelligence is needed to give us lead time to adjust to marked changes in such emphasis.

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11. The willingness of the Department of Defense to continue mapping work for CIA and the mapping community needs to be established.

12. What collection devices or systems are now in the planning stages which will have a bearing on the character of our research activity?

13. The improvements expected over the next 5 to 15 years in photography and other satellite-borne sensors of the environment need to be defined as closely as possible in order that our programs plan for the utilization of such data.

JAMES A. BRAMMELL

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COPYFifteen Year Intelligence Program -- Military-Economic AnalysisPhase One: Assumptions

It is difficult to know what to do with assumptions that don't make the list. Perhaps assumptions also should be listed for aspects judged as possible, sometimes opposites, but less likely than those included. The present assumptions could be considered the Primary Assumptions. The purpose of a second category would be to allow a planner to examine a broader range of possibilities, and assess the ability of the organization to deal with basically unexpected, but not unforeseeable, situations. It would give a feel for contingencies. An example might be: "patching up (or over) of Sino-Soviet rift but with a bloc less aggressive than current Chinese."

The following are specific comments on the Assumptions as drafted: Expand second general assumption: "No universal disarmament with true safeguards, but continued negotiation, study and consideration of arms limitations and proposals for disarmament." Suggest third general assumption to read: "The continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to include a number of additional countries by the end of the period." [REDACTED]

Phase Two: Guides to Forecasting

The Guides, as drafted, seem to include most of the relevant factors. They would be more useful if ordered along some hierarchy of importance or timing, but it is not obvious how such could be accomplished.

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COPYPhase Three: Statement of Program Objectives

Program objectives which go beyond the next few years are greatly complicated by the several dimensions to the problem; that is, availability or collectability of information, analytical/processing resources and consumer needs. In general we have tended to project on the basis of immediately identifiable needs or trends which are clear for several years. The planning for the forthcoming expansion in the T/O for MRA illustrates the interplay of some of the factors. As a trend, the demands for military-economic intelligence have increased markedly for national intelligence purposes, for US defense planning and for the formulation of arms control and disarmament policy. Analytical resources, at the same time, have been insufficient to satisfy all priority requirements. Discussions have been held with DIA to develop agreement as to roles of both organizations. The types of information now available and expected in the future has been examined to define the areas of analysis which can be pursued most fruitfully. The principal objective over the next several years is to overcome deficiencies in the Agency's capability to produce intelligence on military expenditures and on the direct costs of individual weapons systems and space programs. The current Department of Defense approach to planning has generated requirements for this type of intelligence of higher quality and reliability, in greater detail and specificity and in larger quantity than CIA could supply with current resources. Most of the current pressure for this type of production is related to

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the USSR and its form ranges from contributions to National Estimates to special DoD studies.

A clear and pressing objective as the 1966-70 period progresses will be developing and evolving a complete set of accounts for weapon systems costs, military expenditures and resource allocations devoted to Communist Chinese military programs, as well as for certain of the Eastern European and Free World countries. These will be needed increasingly as attention shifts to the forces, programs, trends, and overall capabilities of the military establishments in these countries, as opposed to the past dominant concern with the USSR.

The requirements for military-economic intelligence in support of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and the Intelligence Assumptions for Planning (IAP) series will continue to broaden, both in the range of topics covered and the increasing levels of sophistication. The IAP, for example, now requires more attention than in the past to detailed elements within the forces considered. A mission such as the general purpose forces takes on an independent importance in many respects equal to that of nuclear offensive or defensive capabilities.

A continuing objective will be to improve intelligence on production facilities and specific deployment programs for weapon systems and forces in the Soviet Union, as in the past and additionally perform similar analysis on Communist China, the European Satellites, and certain Free World countries. This requires assessment and

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integration of evidence collected primarily on a facility or location basis. A very high volume of direct information can be expected, and with it we expect an increasingly important role to the integration and analysis of information from various sources so that programs, forces, trends, and overall capabilities are revealed. Support to National Intelligence Papers related to US policy in the arms control and disarmament field is a major objective here.

An additional primary objective is to continue to improve our understanding of the interaction between factors which affect the size and composition of foreign military forces and influence the amount of economic resources allocated to such programs. An accurate understanding of announced military strategic doctrine and policy, together with their effect on the shape of the forces in being, is indispensable to sound intelligence projections of future military programs. Integrated studies of these topics is now underway.

1971-75

It is very difficult to state program objectives in terms of analysis for a period as far out at 1971-75, except as extrapolations of current trends. As such we would expect increasing analytical attention to the problem of Communist China and certain Free World countries. In line with the assumption of continued lively competition between the US and the USSR in spaceflight, we would expect to continue to focus on capabilities and alternatives open to the USSR and other countries during this period. Problems such as nuclear

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proliferation will probably be less easily structured than present problems. This, in turn, will require increasing analytical flexibility, and the buildup of analytical skills among professional personnel.

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COPYSUGGESTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF A FIFTEEN-YEAR INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMEconomic AnalysisPhase One: Assumptions

1. General Comment. Greater specificity would help us a great deal in responding meaningfully to Phase IV. Perhaps some over-all judgment, such as "the 1966-70 period will be one of increasing instability throughout the world," would be useful in setting the tone. Also, for 1971-80, a similar comment is in order.

2. Suggested Additionsa. For 1966-70

(1) East European Communist countries gain increasing independence from Moscow, with economic ties to Western Europe and the United States reflecting consequent growth.

(2) Armed clashes between Free World nations, largely motivated by non-Communist reasons, increase.

(3) The NATO Alliance is dissolved, to be replaced by a US, UK, West German alliance in which many present Western European NATO nations join, except for France.

b. For 1971-80

- The death of General DeGaulle is followed by France's rejoining of a loose military alliance with her former military partners in NATO, and by an economic union between the EFTA and EEC groups.

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- Economic costs and technical resource considerations require close collaboration of Western European countries (including Japan) with the U.S. in military and space developments.

- A united Western Germany emerges under appropriate safeguards insisted on by the USSR.

### 3. Suggested Revisions

- a. For 1966-70. Delete, "The Sino-Soviet rift persists, but is about evenly counterbalanced by disunity in the Western Alliance," and substitute:

- The divisive forces in the world Communist movement grow as nationalism becomes increasingly important in local party decisions. The Sino-Soviet rift hardens, Eastern European countries pursue more independent courses of action, and Free World crypto-Communist regimes shift their positions with frequency.

- A few additional Free World nations set up openly Communist regimes.

- b. For 1971-80. Add on to, "Communist China surpasses," etc., the following, "although the USSR continues its subversive activities in Free World countries by all possible means short of open warfare."

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COPYPhase Two: Guides to Forecasting

1. General Comment. The "guides to forecasting" are now written from the standpoint of U.S. intelligence as a whole. It would be helpful in Phase IV if these "guides" could be broken down into two parts -- (1) those which apply to intelligence generally, and (2) those which apply to CIA only. (See below under "Suggested Additions," for some which apply to CIA only.)

2. Suggested Additions

a. Those Which Apply to CIA

- This Agency will increase its role over time as the centralized producer of intelligence to the point where it services virtually all national intelligence requirements from its own analytical resources. (One part of such a shift would be the assumption of production responsibilities, for national intelligence purposes, in the economic field, world-wide.)

- The needs for quick-reaction current intelligence will increase to the level where 24-hour manning of all offices will be required.

- Competition from business and the academic world for highly competent professional personnel will become so keen that training programs under Agency sponsorship will have to be greatly stepped up, as will recruiting activities.

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- The grave challenge Communist China could pose to world peace in the 1971-80 period, the present scarcity of language and area competent personnel, and the long and expensive training period required, suggests the need for a special "China program" for Agency development.

b. Those Which Apply Generally

- Special collection devices must be developed to provide a flow of non-photographic intelligence on Communist countries, given their highly secretive nature.

Phase III: Statement of Program Objectives

1. For 1966-70.

a. USSR. Production of economic intelligence on Communist countries, particularly on the USSR, will continue to be this Agency's primary economic research priority. Problems of resource allocation, particularly the prospects for agriculture and the impact of military programs on economic growth, will be of key importance in determining capabilities. Additional personnel will be needed to carry forward the implementation of the McCone-Carroll agreement for studies on the strategic impact of projected Soviet military programs. The externals of Soviet economic power -- trade with Western and Eastern Europe, and trade-aid activities in Free World developing

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nations, particularly the flow of arms in support of insurgency movements -- are likely to continue to demand major attention for purposes of operational support.

b. East European Countries. While no longer "Satellites" of Moscow, the economic viability of these Communist nations, particularly as they turn to the West for trade and development assistance, will demand analysis in depth. President Johnson's program of "building bridges to Eastern Europe" is present policy. The report to the President of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries and the Soviet Union, dated 29 April 1965, recommends a more flexible U.S. trade policy, designed to carry U.S. policy objectives forward more aggressively. The Economic Research Area, ORR, represents virtually the sole U.S. Government resource which can supply the policy level with comprehensive analyses of East European economies needed prior to making decisions.

c. Communist China. China will continue to be caught in the vise of very limited economic means and great political ambitions, world-wide in scope. While she has been successful in founding an initial advanced weapons industry, including nuclear devices, her economic condition remains most precarious because of the growing food deficit. In an almost total statistical blackout, the key question, whether China's great power

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pretensions will break up on the rocks of agricultural failure, must be accurately assessed. At the same time, a widening of Communist Chinese involvement in Free World underdeveloped countries through economic and military assistance grows, making much more complex the problem of future reporting on the international arms traffic, while at the same time the need for accurate and timely reporting in support of both policy and operations will continue to grow.

d. Free World. The current trend of requests for economic analyses on the Free World continues to be upward. These requests reflect not only the economic intelligence support requirements engendered by wars of national liberation, such as in Vietnam, but also by the need for the U.S. to develop attractive counter programs. There is a further dimension -- the increasing division within the industrialized nations of the Free World itself -- the impending breakup of NATO, the EFTA-EEC division which threatens to break Western Europe into two economic parts, are only two of the growing problems of key concern to the U.S. The maximum analytical resources which can presently be devoted to Free World economic research in support of national policy are currently rigidly circumscribed. The future role of this Agency in the production of Free World economic intelligence needs resolution.

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COPY2. For 1971-80.

a. Introduction. It is difficult to "time phase" economic research program objectives which would be significantly different for 1971-75 as compared to 1976-80. The growing economic gap between the "have" and "have not" nations could produce additional tensions in the late 1970's above those which would be present in the early 1970's, which in turn could expand requirements for economic research. However, at this time, program objectives in the 1971-75 and 1976-80 period are seen as largely identical.

b. USSR. Throughout the decade of the 1970's, the USSR will remain the nation whose economic potential for the development and maintenance of a military establishment will be second only to that of the United States. The same relationship between the U.S. and the USSR will also apply to aid, trade and related external activities with the developing countries. However, partly through the evolutionary impact of education and improved means of communication, the latent desire of the Soviet people for a far larger share of material production will be more difficult to deny. The 1970's are likely to be the years when the internal debate on resource allocation is sharpest, when shifts in the official policy line are frequent, and where the need for accurate, timely analyses of internal Soviet economic developments will be very great. Hence, it is difficult to foresee a time when it will be possible to release research resources from the USSR for the purpose of making economic studies of other target countries.

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c. East European Countries. It seems most unlikely that the unification of Germany, or at least the initiation and conduct of intensive diplomatic discussions on unification, can be postponed beyond the 1970's. As with disarmament and East-West trade, we should anticipate a heavy load of economic intelligence support for these discussions. If President Johnson's plan for "building bridges" to Eastern Europe is to progress, the 1970's appear to be the years of active exploration and enactment of economic measures designed to loosen ties to Moscow and increase Eastern Europe's ties to the West and particularly to the United States. At the same time, important policy decisions are likely to need economic intelligence support -- should something like the present PL-480 law be extended to Eastern European Communist countries to make good a growing food deficit; can the U.S. encourage its nationals to form joint industrial enterprises with, say, Bulgaria? Given the political objective of wooing Eastern Europe, the task of implementation becomes largely one of economic measures, for Moscow's grip on this region is now largely an economic one.

d. Communist China. The success, or partial success, of new collection devices in supplying us with information on Communist China's agriculture and industries would create a parallel need to devote additional analytical resources to the task of measuring, far more accurately than can currently be done, that nation's

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capability to move forward toward her goal of becoming a world power. At the same time, should China succeed in making progress in her economy, almost certainly her attempts to subvert the newly emergent Free World countries would multiply. The prospect of open U.S.-Chinese hostilities is a contingency real enough to require advance intelligence preparation, including prominent research on all of the military related economic activities, such as transportation and communications, which have traditionally been carried out by this Agency.

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24 May 1965

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ASSUMPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE WORLD SITUATION UPON  
WHICH MIGHT BE RESTED A LONG-TERM PLAN FOR US INTELLIGENCE

1. Given: The exercise involves planning for fifteen years. Under the present terms of reference, this period is divided into three sub-periods of five years each, i.e., 1965-70, 1970-75, 1975-80.
2. The assumptions section should probably begin with a paragraph or a table which takes account of:
  - a) estimated US population in 1970, -75, and -80;
  - b) estimated US GNP for these years; c) estimated US budget for these years. With respect to the budget estimates, some cognizance must be taken of the possibility of wide swings in the over-all defense component which in turn is likely to depend in large measure on other assumptions relating to the degree of tension in the world situation.
3. The kind of world situation which the US must confront and the US intelligence effort to be meshed into it will probably be a function of various combinations of

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the following two factors: a) the number of power centers of the first and perhaps second order of importance, and b) the degree of international tension,

I. The most dangerous world situation would be that characterized by many power centers and a high order of tension between them.

II. Next less dangerous, a few power centers with a high level of tension.

III. Next less dangerous, many power centers with a low level of tension.

IV. Least dangerous, few power centers with low level of tension.

4. Power Centers. We may assume with a fair degree of confidence that the number of power centers between now and 1970 is most likely to remain "a few." However, looking ahead more than five years, our confidence factor begins to decline. At this moment, the Chinese Communists seem the likeliest candidate to be joining the power center club. Obviously we cannot exclude Germany, or even Japan for that matter. Less likely, but still to be taken into account, are the UK, France; perhaps India and Indonesia. There are other potentials which are rather far out.

5. International Tension. The rise and fall of international tension is in itself a function of many things, some of them wholly unpredictable. A principal cause for heightened tensions over the entire period will inhere in the relationship between states operating under one or another manifestation of Communist ideology, and those wanting no part of Communism. Second will be the nationalistic initiatives undertaken by new and backward states, often egged on by one or more Communist states. The above is the prescription for "wars of national liberation" which in the right circumstances can become quite substantial wars, bringing with them dramatic rises in the level of international tensions. Thirdly, there are in today's world a dozen, a score, or a few score -- depending on how you measure them -- of friction points. Just for example, today we have Vietnam, Berlin, the Dominican Republic. Tomorrow, we may have an ominous flash in Korea, in the Taiwan Strait, on India's northern boundary, in Indian-Pak relations, in Arab-Israeli relations, and so on and so on.

6. Assumptions for the period 1965-70. The most valid assumptions for this period are II and IV.

With respect to II, the real power centers for the next five years are most likely to remain the US and USSR.

For the short-term at least, there will be a high degree of tension between the US and Communist China and a growing tension between the US and the USSR. However, the force of mutual deterrence will make the coming of all-out war between the US and USSR highly unlikely. Chinese nuclear capabilities will almost certainly not have grown in the five year period to the point where the Chinese could contemplate a nuclear attack on the US or allies of the US. Nevertheless, a substantial non-nuclear armed conflict with the Chinese is possible. Should this occur, world tensions would remain high and the risks of general nuclear war by miscalculation would rise appreciably.

7. We may likewise assume that the Chinese are presently running something of a bluff in the teeth of over-whelming US nuclear superiority and finding little or no support from the Soviet Union will temporarily knuckle under. Should this occur there would be a period again of only two power centers and a relatively low level of world tensions (IV).

8. Note that the above rests on still other assumptions, namely no general war occasioned by accident or miscalculation, no universally recognized disarmament agreement with sure-fire census and verification procedures, no dramatic proliferation of nuclear powers consequent to technological breakthrough through [REDACTED]

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9. Assumptions for the period 1970-75, and on to 1980. For this period we must assume a growth in the number of power centers. Unless nascent Chinese nuclear capabilities are destroyed in the preceeding period, Peiping will be very much in the Big League in Asia and perhaps elsewhere. As noted above, the

[REDACTED]

may have become a reality. There may be other significant emergent power centers. The most likely world situation in these circumstances would be I. However, III is possible.

10. The above also rests on still other assumptions. For example, subsuming I is China's achievement of a considerable nuclear stature -- [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Subsuming III is the possibility that humanity,



every day more and more aware of the suicidal course of events, will have frightened itself into taking some sort of corrective action. This will have to involve such startling developments as the voluntary acceptance of limitations of sovereignty in behalf of collective security.

11. Over-all. Whatever the status of the world situation in the next fifteen years, we may assume that there will never be a moment when the US can be wholly certain of safe-guarding its national security by non-military means. Whatever the degree of detente, world tensions will never drop to the vanishing point. Furthermore, whatever the scale and nature of armament or disarmament, there will have to be a large and continuing national intelligence effort to guide the one and police the other.

18 May 1965

A FIRST CUT AT THE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS PROBLEM  
FOR A FIFTEEN YEAR PLAN

1. To begin with, for purposes of one part of this exercise, let us assume:

- a) No all-out nuclear conflict;
- b) No universal disarmament arrangement with fool-proof <sup>sensors</sup> censurs and verification;
- c) No technological cataclysms which would result in fissionable material becoming no more difficult to manufacture than black powder.

There are probably a few other assumptions we should introduce at this point. Query: world-wide and profound economic depression; population explosion reaching undreamed of heights; and others further out?

2. The highest priority intelligence requirements for the next fifteen years must be those surrounding our literal physical survival. No matter how much Soviet or even Chinese ideological fervor may decline, it will almost certainly be supplanted by an equally

robust and antagonistic national fervor. This will mean that the US will continue to live under the nuclear gun soon to be in the hands of both Soviets and Chinese, and who knows what other countries. Our security will regrettably depend in the first instance upon our own defense effort and the effectiveness of our defense in turn will be dependent entirely upon our full and certain knowledge of what we are defending against.

Survival intelligence therefore will be that which maintains an accurate inventory of the strike and defensive capabilities in being of our real and potential adversaries and sound estimates of the precise dimensions of their strategic stature to five or even ten years hence. This latter would involve judgments as to their development of nuclear weapons systems, the probable performance characteristics of the weapons in question, and the scale and nature of their probable deployment. It obviously would involve cognate judgments relating to the manning of the military establishment.

3. Second priority intelligence requirements would also partake of the nature of survival intelligence. These,

however, would derive from our adversaries' capabilities and intentions to engage in the many facets of Cold War activity. The spectrum would stretch from intention and ability to engage directly or indirectly in wars of national liberation all the way through to common or garden varieties of relatively bloodless subversion, blackmail, subornation, or the convincing lie. If we retain our capability to destroy the enemy who risks a nuclear attack, we may find ourselves living in a world where mutual deterrence reigns. In this case our enemies will be endeavoring to do us in by the undramatic but nonetheless lethal techniques of the Cold War.

Our intelligence must be good enough to identify throughout the world the vulnerable places our enemies are likely to attack; good enough to foretell the probable method of attack; and good enough to offer wise counsel to those committed to meet or counter the attack.

Nor should this category of intelligence be considered only as purely defensive. It must also be good enough to give the planning for our own Cold War initiatives the required foundation.

4. A fourth category of intelligence which we shall require will be that relating specifically to organic change

in the world Communist movement and in its many national components. Just as fundamental notions of Communism have changed enormously since the Russian revolution (and just as fundamental notions of monarchy, nineteenth century republicanism, etc., changed in their times) so will these fundamentals continue to evolve in the years ahead. It is likely that some orthodox tenet of this year may soon become a heresy and that which is today a heresy strictly kosher a few years hence. What seems to be true for Communism in general will be true for each national component. I very much doubt, for example, that ten years from now the Chinese Communist leadership will be talking pure Mao.

Whatever its form and substance, however, the states which believe and preach its evolving doctrines are almost certain to continue to be aligned against us. To continue to cope with them -- most notably in a Cold War situation -- our appreciation of the true nature of their ideology must be as up-to-the-minute as possible.

5. The rest of the intelligence chore, and a very substantial requirement it will be, will be that in support of our role as leader of the Free World striving for a better world order as we see it. This -- the "no sparrow

shall fall" -- category of intelligence is a necessary luxury. We must afford it not merely because we are in fact the world's most affluent society, but because if we do not produce this kind of intelligence and pass it on to our less affluent friends and allies, we will be denying them a sort of international service of common concern which we alone are able to perform for the common good.